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5	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
6	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7	In re
8	AUTOMATIONSOLUTIONS N. 01 11051
9	INTERNATIONAL, LLC, No. 01-11951 Debtor(s).
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11	THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS,
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13	Plaintiff(s),
14	v. A.P. No. 03-1141
15	THOMAS V. SACCO,
16	Defendant(s).
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18	Memorandum on Motion to Dismiss
19	Adversary Proceeding 02-1092 was an action involving the same parties in which the plaintiff
20	sought collection of a note. The court transferred the matter to the District Court because it thought
21	defendant Thomas Sacco had a right to a jury trial and did not seek to have the matter heard in this cour
22	This adversary proceeding involves the same parties, but seeks to avoid a security interest claimed by
23	Sacco as a fraudulent transfer. Sacco seeks dismissal of this case or transfer to the District Court,
24	arguing that the same issues are already before the District Court in the prior adversary proceeding or

Unfortunately, this court was remiss in not carefully reviewing Sacco's counterclaim in the

that the issues raised here should have been raised there.

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earlier adversary proceeding, which contained allegations that the estate is indebted to him in the amount of \$502,500.00 and a prayer for damages in this amount together with prejudgment interest, court costs and attorneys' fees. Had the court noted this counterclaim, it would have at least severed this portion of the counterclaim before transferring it to the District Court, as Sacco is seeking money from the estate.\(^1\) More likely, however, the court would have kept the entire case; once a party has submitted a claim against the bankruptcy estate, he has consented to the bankruptcy court's equitable power to allow or disallow claims and waived any right to a jury. *Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg*, 492 U.S. 33, 59 n. 14, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). It does not matter whether the claim is submitted by a formal proof of claim or by counterclaim; if the intent is to recover anything from the estate, the right to a jury is waived. *Matter of Peachtree Lane Assoc., Ltd.,* 150 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1998). As the District Court noted in *In re Larry's Apartment, LLC,,* 210 B.R. 469, 473-74 (D. Ariz. 1997):

Since *Granfinanciera* and *Langenkamp* were decided, courts have construed counterclaims filed in an adversary proceeding as claims against the bankruptcy estate which divest a defendant in an adversary proceeding of the right to a jury trial. See, *Peachtree Lane Assoc., Ltd. v. Granader*, 175 B.R. 232, 236 (N.D.III.1994) (defendants in an adversary action waived their right to a jury trial by filing counterclaims and successfully seeking an extension of the bar date so that their counterclaims could be treated as proofs of claim against the estate); *In re Hudson*, 170 B.R. 868, 874 (E.D.N.C.1994) ( "convincing authority has held that a counterclaim does qualify as a 'claim' for purposes of the ... *Granfinanciera* and *Langenkamp* private rights jury trial analysis ... the defendant's filing of a counterclaim caused the defendant to lose it's Seventh Amendment right to jury trial"); *In re Lang*, 166 B.R. 964, 966 (D.Utah 1994); *Americana Expressways, Inc.*, 161 B.R. at 714 ("[b]y presenting a [defense which, in reality, presents a counterclaim against the estate], Defendant has submitted to the bankruptcy court's equity jurisdiction and is not entitled to a jury trial").

Having transferred the prior adversary proceeding to the District Court when it probably should not have done so, this court has created a confusing situation which only the District Court can resolve, either by referring that adversary proceeding back to this court, severing out and transferring those portions asserting a claim against the estate, withdrawing the reference of the entire bankruptcy case, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Distribution of an estate is an equitable matter to be decided by a single court to insure that the rights of third parties are protected and the estate is distributed according to law.

otherwise providing direction to the parties and this court.

In this adversary proceeding, plaintiff seeks to avoid Sacco's security interest as a fraudulent transfer. It is a core matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H), and should be tried without a jury for the reasons stated above. Sacco's motion to dismiss will accordingly be denied, and it is not appropriate for this court to transfer the matter to the District Court although the District Court can certainly withdraw the reference if it wishes to take the case. Sacco's motion will accordingly be denied. However, the court will stay all activity in this case in this court for 90 days, in order to afford time for District Court consideration.

Counsel for plaintiff shall submit an appropriate form of order.

Dated: July 26, 2003

[serve Davis and Katz]

Alan Jaroslovsky U.S. Bankruptcy Judge